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Abstract
We examine a setting in which property rights are initially ambiguously defined.
Whether the parties go to court to remove the ambiguity or bargain and settle
privately, they incur enforcement costs. When the parties bargain, a version of the
Coase theorem holds. Despite the additional costs of going to court, other ex post
ine.ciencies, and the absence of incomplete information, however, going to court
may be an equilibrium or ex ante Pareto-superior over settlement; this is
especially true in dynamic settings whereby a court decision saves on future
enforcement costs. When the parties do not negotiate and go to court the Coase
theorem ceases to hold, and a simple rule for the initial assignment of rights
maximizes net surplus. 
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A paper circulated under the same title and dated March, 6, 2000 contained the
basic structure examined in this paper, but did not develop many of the results
reported here. For comments, we would like to thank participants at the WZB-
CEPR contests conference that took place in Berlin, November 2001.
 Perhaps because the Coase theorem is not a Theorem in the mathematical
sense of the term, its meaning and implications are far from being settled
more than four decades after its initial formulation in Ronald H. Coase
(1960). For instance, Dan Usher (1998) has recently provided an elementary
scrutiny of the possible meanings of the theorem and found them wanting,
as suggested by the provocative title of his article: “The Coase Theorem is
Tautological, Incoherent, or Wrong.” At this late date, one would expect to
have such issues settled, but it is surprising how little systematic follow-up
has been to Coase’s own call for examining the case of positive transaction
costs (see, for example, Coase, 1992, page 717 ).
One line of research has focused on the role of incomplete information as a
source of transaction costs. It is straightforward to show under such condi-
tions that the initial assignment of property rights matters for eﬃciency (see
for example Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1983; Richard
D. McKelvey and Talbot Page, 1998). What is much harder to determine,
however, is whether a third party with limited information — a “bumbling
bureaucrat” in Joseph P. Farrell’s (1987) terminology — can make the cor-
rect decision and pick the more eﬃcient property rights structure. In some
cases a bumbling bureaucrat can rely on simple enough pieces of informa-
tion to make the correct decision, in others not. Then, other than that it
depends on the particular circumstances little more can be said from such a
viewpoint, a position that could be interpreted as being in favor of a weak
version of the Coase theorem.
A neglected aspect of the study of property rights is that they are often costly
to enforce and thus can be considered a signiﬁcant component of the rarely
2deﬁned and operationalized term of transaction costs. Apart from resorting
to violence or the threat of it — a not uncommon form of enforcement in much
of the world even nowadays — there are signiﬁcant costs in securing title to
assets in all economies. It is costly to enforce rights to standardized assets
like real estate in developed economies, and there are even higher costs in
claiming property rights on less standardized cases like intellectual property
and nuisance disputes. In this paper we study the eﬀect of enforcement
costs and, in the main interpretation that we adopt, we focus on the eﬀect
of litigation costs that are incurred to secure either a better settlement or a
favorable court decision.
To focus solely on the eﬀects of costly enforcement, we do not allow for any
income eﬀects, incomplete information, bargaining costs, or other asymme-
tries. Our main assumption is that the parties are unable to commit not to
engage in enforcement activities; in particular, they are unable to commit
not to engage in exploratory litigation eﬀort and other preparatory measures
towards bringing a case to court. If commitment were possible and the par-
ties could contract on the level of enforcement, then they could avoid them
altogether. The assumption is thus analogous to the non-contractibility of
relationship-speciﬁc investments in the theory of the ﬁrm (Sanford J. Gross-
man and Oliver D. Hart, 1986). Property rights are ambiguously deﬁned in
the sense that the court’s decision is uncertain, though other things being
equal one party has higher probability of winning and that party is said to
have the initial, ambiguously deﬁned property right. Conditional on this
initial right, enforcement eﬀorts inﬂuence the probability of each party’s
winning in court.
3We ﬁrst examine a static model in which the two parties can engage in bar-
gaining both before and after going to court. Bargaining and settlement
involve both the sharing of a larger surplus than otherwise and the saving of
some of the costs of going to court. Settling before going to court is shown
then to be subgame perfect. Equilibrium enforcement eﬀorts under such
a settlement are independent of the initial assignment of property rights.
When, however, the parties cannot bargain and expect to go to court, en-
forcement costs can be low enough that at least one party can be better oﬀ
ex ante by committing not to bargain. Moreover, in such conditions, who
has the initial property right matters for eﬃciency and a simple rule can be
used to decide who should be assigned that right.
Going to court resolves all or part of the uncertainty about who has the
property right. The implication, then, is that court decisions can reduce or
eliminate enforcement costs in he future. With that observation in mind, we
next examine dynamic versions of our model. For a wide set of conditions,
we ﬁnd that going to court is a subgame perfect equilibrium despite the
absence of incomplete information or other complications that would be
typically associated with conﬂictual outcomes. The parties may decide to
go to court because the resolution of uncertainty about property rights saves
future enforcement costs. Bargaining and settlement can still take place once
a court decision has been made and, in such a case, a version of the Coase
theorem holds. As in the static model, however, tying one’s hands not to
negotiate can be more eﬃcient and also a bumbling bureaucrat could follow
a simple rule for assigning the more eﬃcient property rights structure.
The possibility of going to court under complete information is also of in-
4terest for the literature on the economics of trials.1 To our knowledge, such
a possibility has not been rigorously demonstrated in other research. The
closest papers to ours are Chulho Jung et al. (1995) and Cooter (1982).
Jung et al. analyze a game of incomplete, asymmetric information in which
players use valuable resources in order to inﬂuence the distribution of prop-
erty rights. They obtain the result that low inﬂuence costs are less likely to
be associated with Coasean bargaining. However, they consider only ﬁxed,
exogenous inﬂuence costs in their analysis, and do not explore bargaining
possibilities in any great detail. Cooter, on the other hand, develops a
“Hobbes Theorem” which suggests that the role of law is to minimize the
ineﬃciencies that result when bargaining breaks down, by restricting the
threats which parties can make against each other. The spirit of this result
is similar to the results that we derive in the latter part of the paper.
I. The Basic Setting: The Rancher Versus the
Farmer
We consider two parties, a farmer (f)a n darancher (r ). The rancher
undertakes an activity (say, raising cattle) that produces output x ∈ [0,∞)
which yields proﬁts or private beneﬁts B(x). We assume B :[ 0 ,∞) → [0,∞)
1Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1989) represents an earlier survey of the
literature. Our approach is based on the theory of contests; related contributions include
Avery W. Katz (1988), Jack Hirshleifer and Evan Osborne (2001), and Amy Farmer and
Paul Pecorino (1999). Other contributions delve deeper into the microanalytics of evidence
production (see Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2000, and Jesse Bull and
Joel Watson, 2001). An analogous result for the occurrence of conﬂict and war has been
s h o w ni nM i c h e l l eR .G a r ﬁnkel and Stergios Skaperdas (2000). In that setting, conﬂict
can occur despite its costly nature because in dynamic setting there are compounding
rewards to the winner and savings of future resources.
5is bounded, increasing and strictly concave on its domain of deﬁnition. The
production of x generates a cost of C(x) to the farmer by, for example, having
t h ec a t t l et r a m p l es o m eo ft h ef a r m e r ’ sc r o p s . W ea s s u m eC :[ 0 ,∞) →
[0,∞) is bounded, increasing and strictly convex. We further assume that
B(0) = C(0) = 0, and that C (x) <B (x) for at least one x ∈ (0,∞). The
assumptions on B(x) ensure that there exists a unique xr ∈ (0,∞)w h i c h
maximizes the rancher’s beneﬁt B(x). The farmer’s optimal level of x is
clearly 0. Let x∗ denote the socially optimal level of production, so that
x∗ =a r g m a x x{B(x) − C(x)}. The assumptions on B(x)a n dC(x)ensure
that such a socially optimal level of externality exists, and that it is unique.
It is also straightforward to show that 0 <x ∗ <x r;t h a ti s ,t h ep r o ﬁt-
maximizing level of the rancher’s activity is higher than the socially optimal
level of the activity which, in turn, is higher than what the farmer would
most prefer. Figure 1 illustrates one possible set of B(x)a n dC(x) functions
that satisfy the properties we have just described.
Figure 1
6In the absence of third-party enforcement, laws, or any norms about who
has the right to choose the level of activity x, private enforcement through
the threat of violence would be the typical condition. Indeed one pos-
sible logical interpretation of the Coase Theorem is that “resources will be
allocated eﬃciently regardless of whether or not there is assignment of prop-
erty rights” (Usher, 1998, p.4) and therefore private enforcement through
violence would be the setting one would want to examine in order to inves-
tigate the Coase Theorem in the presence of enforcement costs.2 However,
Coase’s own writings and much of the subsequent literature presupposes the
existence of laws, courts, enforcement, and assignment of property rights.
Therefore, in the remainder we assume the presence of these institutions,
although a limiting case of our model could be interpreted to apply to the
case of violence as well.3
For our purposes here, we suppose that the parties can clarify their legal
positions by going to court. To model this, we assume that the players
engage in a probabilistic contest to enforce property rights, the outcome of
which is ex ante uncertain. The winning player in the contest is awarded
the property right to choose x unilaterally. The players can inﬂuence their
winning probabilities in the contest by investing in “enforcement activities”,
a generic term which refers to the costs of hiring of counsel and expert
witnesses, payments to other legal and scientiﬁc researchers and private
investigators, and other disbursements associated with the civil litigation
2Usher does not claim that this is the appropriate statement of the Coase theorem:
just that it is one of several possible interpretations.
3In particular, this is the case when the parameter ϕ (deﬁned below) takes the value
of 1/2 and the contest success function (also deﬁned below) is interpreted as a technology
of conﬂict. For related work, see the collections of articles in Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas
(1996) and Hirshleifer (2001).
7process. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the win probabilities depend directly
on these enforcement activities and obey a contest success function.4
Let ef and er be the amount that the farmer and the rancher invest in
enforcement activities, and let ϕ ∈ (0,1). Then the rancher’s probability of
winning can be described by the following function:






if er + ef > 0
1
2 otherwise
where f is a non-negative, continuous, increasing function, with f(0) ≥ 0.5
Note that since p(er,e f) is a probability for all values of (er,e f), we must
have that the probability of the farmer winning the contest is 1 − p(er,e f).
The parameter ϕ ∈ [0,1] represents the degree of “right” that the rancher
and the farmer have over the choice of x. For example assuming ϕ =1o r
ϕ = 0 represents the case in which binding legal precedent, legislation, or the
facts of the case completely favor either the rancher or the farmer in gaining
the unilateral right to choose x. Any other value of ϕ ∈ (0,1) represents
a situation where the legal or factual situation is not completely biased in
favor of either party. Thus, we can also think of ϕ as a measure of the degree
4The approach and functional form used here is examined in detail in the rent seeking
literature, and was pioneered by Gordon Tullock (1980). It is utilized in many diﬀerent
contexts other than political economy, including, for example, the analysis of R&D contests
in the theory of industrial organization (Avinash K. Dixit (1987)), and also in labor
economics (Sherwin Rosen (1986)).
5We make more assumptions on f later to ensure the existence and uniquenessof pure
strategy equilibria. This functional form is a special case of the n-player asymmetric
rent seeking contest analyzed by Mark Gradstein (1995). For an axiomatization of the
case f(e)=e
m, see Derek Clark and Christian Riis (1998). Amy Farmer and Paul
Pecorino (1999), Antonio Bernardo et. al. (2000), and Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001)
use this functional form. Fullerton and MacAfee (1999) provide an additional analytical
justiﬁcation for this functional form in the context of research tournaments.
8of ambiguity of property rights, or even the general “eﬀectiveness” of the
legal system, where eﬀectiveness refers to the law’s ability to generate and
sustain well deﬁned, widely applicable rules.6
Although the nature of the true legal relationship between the parties is not
completely clear at the outset, we assume that both parties know the value
of ϕ with probability one. Thus, one way of thinking about ϕ is to regard
it as the parties’ common estimate of the true nature of the legal or factual
relationship between them, given the particular characteristics of the legal
environment.
We can further suppose that the ambiguity of property rights is given in the
following sense: ϕ (and 1 − ϕ) can only take one of two values, ϕ0 or 1 − ϕ0
(where ϕ0 > 1/2). When ϕ = ϕ0, then the rancher can be said to posses the
(ambiguous) property right to set x,a n dw h e nϕ =1 −ϕ0 it is the farmer who
can be said to possess the (ambiguous) right to set x.T h elevel of ϕ0 should
be considered to be beyond the control of government oﬃcials and, of course,
beyond the control of the parties involved in the dispute. It is supposed to
be part of the legal system that can be changed only through major changes
in governance. However, the particular assignment of the ambiguous right
could be made by administrative decision or regulation and its ambiguity is
due to the fact that such a decision can be challenged in court.
Does assigning the property right in the sense just described make a diﬀer-
ence? If not, we would then have a version of the Coase Theorem in the
6Another way to think about ϕ is to follow Hirshleifer and Osborne(2001) by assuming
that ϕ represents a legal “fault factor” orthe “advantage of having truth on one’s side.”
Alternatively, Katz (1988) and Farmer and Pecorino (1999) (who use a function somewhat
similar to ours), call ϕ t h e“ o b j e c t i v em e r i t so ft h ec a s e . ”
9presence of costly enforcement. If yes, the question emerges of whether a
bumbling bureaucrat with minimal information at his disposal could make
the right decision and assign the ambiguous property right to one party so
that welfare is maximized.
We assume that both parties are risk neutral. If the parties were to go to
court, then, their payoﬀs would be as follows:
(2) V c
r ≡ p(er,e f)Br − (1 + β)er
and
(3) V c
f ≡− p(er,e f)Cr − (1 + β)ef
where Br = B(xr), Cr = C(xr),and β > 0. These payoﬀsr e q u i r es o m e
explanation. Consider equation (2). In the event of a rancher victory (which
occurs with probability p(er,e f)), he chooses x = xr, gains Br, and pays er.
Should the rancher lose (with probability 1 − p(er,e f)), the farmer would
choose x = 0 and the rancher’s payoﬀ is simply 0−er = −er. Weighting these
payoﬀs by the appropriate win and loss probabilities gives the expression in
(2). The expected payoﬀ for the farmer is derived in a similar fashion to yield
equation (3). Finally, we should mention that the parameter β represents
the additional marginal cost of actually going to court over just gearing up
to go to court.7
7Of course, there are diﬀerent ways of modeling the costs of going to court: a ﬁxed
cost, a “melting” of part of the pie that is contested, and so on. None of out results
depend on the particular way we model the costs of going to court.
10II. Incentives to Bargain and Settle
Once a case goes to court and a decision is made about who has the right
to choose x, the two parties would have the incentive to bargain over the
actual choice of x.B yd e ﬁnition, the total surplus is maximized at x∗ and
has a value of S∗ = B(x∗) − C(x∗). If the rancher were to win the right to
choose x, he could be induced to choose that level x∗ instead of his privately
optimal level xr in exchange for a large enough transfer from the farmer.
Similarly, if the farmer were to be granted the right to choose x,al a r g e
enough transfer from the farmer could make him choose x∗ instead of his
optimal level of 0.
Whereas the surplus-maximizing choice of x provides incentives for ex post
bargaining — for bargaining once a court decision has been made — there
are also incentives for bargaining before going to court, as going to court
entails additional costs. For this ex ante bargaining to take place and lead
to a settlement that avoids the costs of going to court, the two parties
would obviously have to agree on a choice of x, which we can assume to be
the surplus-maximizing one, and on a transfer from one party to another
that deters both parties from going to court. Clearly, with the two parties
bargaining and settling, the going-to-court payoﬀ functions in (2) and (3)
would be inappropriate. To arrive at the appropriate deﬁnition of the payoﬀ
functions when bargaining and settlement are allowed and to further clarify
the environment we are examining, there are four distinct stages in the game:
1. Both parties choose initial enforcement eﬀorts er and ef.
2. The parties negotiate in the shadow of the court and possibly settle.
113. If no settlement takes place, the case goes to court and the parties
expend βer and βef resources on litigation.
4. Given the court’s decision, the parties can negotiate and settle.
We should emphasize that the level of the initial enforcement eﬀorts, er
and ef, is non-contractible. If that were not the case, the two parties could
choose to set them equal to zero and avoid all the enforcement costs. Our
approach is similar to the incomplete contracts approach to the theory of the
ﬁrm (see, for example, Grossman and Hart, 1986, or Hart, 1995) in which
the non-contractible quantities are relationship-speciﬁc investments.
In each bargaining situation we follow standard practice in supposing that
the outcome of bargaining depends on (i) the surplus available for division;
and (ii) on the disagreement (or threat) utilities that each party has in the
event that bargaining breaks down. Moreover, we suppose that the parties,
given their respective disagreement utilities, split the surplus. Because there
are no income eﬀects in our setting (intentionally so), we have transferable
utility, and the Pareto frontier is a straight line, this supposition appears
reasonable; it coincides not only with the Nash bargaining solution but
also with any other symmetric bargaining solution.8 It is also the only
bargaining outcome that would not provide one side with more exogenous
bargaining power than the other.
As is evident from our discussion on the incentives to bargain above, we sup-
8For noncooperative implementations of this solution, see Ken Binmore et al (1986).
The appropriate noncooperative game for ourca s ei st h eo n ei nw h i c ht h e r ei sa ne x o g e n o u s
risk of breakdown of the bargaining process. When utility is not transferable, diﬀerent
symmetric bargaining solutions can have qualitatively diﬀerent outcomes that can even
be Pareto ranked in some instances — see Nejat Anbarci et al. (forthcoming).
12pose that neither party will engage in a subgame-imperfect manner. Given
that information is complete in our setting and going to court is costly,
then we can expect the two parties to settle at the second stage and not go
to court. The appropriate payoﬀ functions in this case and one important
property of theirs is described next.
Proposition 1 (i) The ex ante bargaining payoﬀ functions in stage 2 are:
(4) V b






































( i i )T h e s es a m ep a y o ﬀ functions would obtain if the stage of ex-post bar-
gaining (stage 4) were not allowed to take place.
Unless otherwise noted, all proofs are to be found in the Appendix. The
ﬁr s tt e r mi ne a c ho ft h ep a y o ﬀ functions represents the share of the total
surplus S∗ received by each party. The remaining terms largely reﬂect the
relative disagreement payoﬀs of the two parties and the bargaining power
that emanates from that source. The higher the probability of the rancher
winning (p(er,e f)=
ϕf(er)
[ϕf(er)+(1−ϕ)f(ef)]), the higher is the rancher’s beneﬁt
Br , and the higher is the cost to the farmer Cr, the higher is the rancher’s
payoﬀ and the lower is the farmer’s payoﬀ. The costs of going to court
(βer for the rancher and βef for the farmer) are actually shared by the two
parties since bargaining takes place before the two parties incur them. As
for the second part of Proposition 1, whether ex post bargaining is allowed
13or not does not make a diﬀerence, ﬁrst, because bargaining costs are zero
and, second, because transferable utility implies that the two parties can
take full account in ex ante bargaining what can occur down the road.
III. When There is Settlement
We next examine the Nash equilibrium that emerges with the payoﬀ func-
tions in (4) and (5) under settlement. The following assumption is suﬃcient
to ensure existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.9
Assumption 1: The function f is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with
f00 ≤ 0 everywhere on its domain of deﬁnition.
In an interior equilibrium the choices of enforcement eﬀorts (eb
r,e b
f)s a t i s f y























































9Weaker conditions also suﬃce to ensure existence of equilibrium in our model — for
example, Skaperdas (1992) and other authors show that as long as f is not “too convex”
a nontrivial equilibrium will exist. The issue is also addressed by Farmer and Pecorino
(1999) in the context of legal battles.
14By Assumption 1, this is possible only if the enforcement eﬀorts of the
rancher and the farmer are identical (eb
r = eb
f = eb). Thus, the probability
of winning of the rancher if they were to go to court (which aﬀects the share
of the total surplus received by each party) would equal ϕ, while that of the
farmer would be 1 − ϕ.
Does it make diﬀerence for the size of the net surplus, whether the adminis-
trator or regulator initially assigns the (ambiguous) right to choose x to the
rancher (ϕ = ϕ0)o rt h ef a r m e r( ϕ =1− ϕ0)? Given that the enforcement










Note that the term ϕ(1 − ϕ) in the left hand side of this equation equals
ϕ0(1−ϕ0), regardless of whether ϕ = ϕ0 or ϕ =1−ϕ0. Since this is the only
place that the value of ϕ enters in the determination of the equilibrium eﬀort
eb,t h a te ﬀort is independent of whether the rancher of farmer have been
assigned the ambiguous right to choose x. Since the surplus S∗ is ﬁxed,
any variations in eﬃciency can only occur through variations in the level of
enforcement eﬀorts. Therefore, as enforcement eﬀorts do not vary with the
assignment of rights, the net surplus does not depend on the assignment of
rights either.
However, from (8) we can determine that the more ambiguous the property
rights are, in the sense that the closer is ϕ0 to 1/2, the higher are the
enforcement eﬀorts and lower is the net surplus. We summarize our ﬁndings
under settlement in the following:
15Proposition 2 Suppose the two parties bargain and settle before going to
court. Then:
(i) The rancher and the farmer choose identical enforcement eﬀorts in equi-
librium;
(ii) Given a level of ambiguity of property rights of ϕ0 > 1/2, these eﬀorts
and the net surplus available for division between the two parties are inde-
pendent of the initial assignment of rights; and
(iii) The more ambiguous are property rights (the closer is ϕ0 to 1/2),t h e
higher are the equilibrium enforcement eﬀorts and the lower is the net sur-
plus.
For f(e)=e, we can analytically calculate the equilibrium. In particular,
the equilibrium eﬀorts and payoﬀsa r e :
eb =
















(4 + β − 2ϕ)(Br + Cr)
2(2 + β)
(11)
We will compare these values to others later.
IV. Settling Versus Going to Court
Although given some initial enforcement choices and that negotiations are
allowed to take place the two parties have an incentive to settle, there are
still reasons for examining the possibility of going to court. Would the
16enforcement eﬀorts diﬀer from those under settlement if the two parties
expected to go to court and, if so, how? Does the version of the Coase
theorem that appears to hold for the case of settlement continue to hold
when the two parties expect to go to court? Are the ex ante equilibrium
payoﬀs under settlement higher than those under going to court? If not,
would there be a way for one or both parties to make an ex ante commitment
n o tt og ot oc o u r t ?
Therefore, we now consider the equilibrium under the payoﬀ functions in
(2) and (3); that is, we consider the game with stages 1 and 3 only. Again,
Assumption 1 guarantees existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. The ﬁrst
order conditions for the rancher and farmer at the equilibrium (ec
r,e c


























where c ≡ Cr/Br(= C(xr)/B(xr)), which is the ratio of social costs to
beneﬁts at the rancher optimal output xr. Note that the assumptions on
B(x)a n dC(x) do not restrict the value of c in anyway, although of course
we always have c>0. When c>1,the costs to the farmer exceed the
beneﬁts to the rancher and therefore the social costs exceed the beneﬁts of
17the activity when the rancher chooses the activity. When c<1, the opposite
holds.
To determine how the equilibrium eﬀorts are related to this cost beneﬁt








where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that f(e)
is an increasing function. Therefore g is monotonically decreasing on its




f)f o r c>1
g(ec
r)=g(ec
f)f o r c =1
g(ec
r) <g (ec
f)f o r c<1
which, together with the fact that g is a decreasing function demonstrates
that ec
r is greater or smaller than ec
f as c is smaller or greater than 1. That
is, the party with relatively more at stake puts more eﬀort in equilibrium.
If the cost that the farmer is trying to avoid is greater than the beneﬁtt h a t
the rancher will receive, then the farmer will exert greater eﬀort. If the
beneﬁtt ot h er a n c h e rw e r et ob eg r e a t e rt h a nt h ec o s tt h ef a r m e rw o u l d
incur, then it would be the farmer who would exert higher eﬀort. This
outcome does not occur in the case of the negotiated settlement because
the two parties split the costs and beneﬁts(because of the assumption of
18symmetry in bargaining), thus contest prizes of the same size, and exert the
same amount of enforcement eﬀort.
The enforcement eﬀorts of course depend on ϕ. Given that the eﬀorts of the
adversaries diﬀer when they expect to go to court and their payoﬀ functions
exhibit an asymmetry that the settlement payoﬀs do not have, the next issue
to examine is whether assigning the initial ambiguous property right to the
rancher (ϕ = ϕ0)o rt ot h ef a r m e r( ϕ =1− ϕ0)m a k e sad i ﬀerence. For a
























Br(1 − c) − (1 + β)(ec
r + ec
f) (18)
The second term in this surplus is the cost of enforcement eﬀorts. The ﬁrst
term represents the expected net social beneﬁt from the choice of x. 10 Note
that this ﬁrst term is positive or negative depending on whether the beneﬁt
Br to the rancher is larger or smaller than the cost Cr to the farmer (or,
whether c is smaller or greater than 1). Thus, for given enforcement eﬀorts
this term is maximized by assigning the ambiguous right to the rancher when
c<1, and assigning to the farmer when c>1. It turns out that the whole
net surplus is also maximized when this rule of property rights assignment
is followed. We state this result as part of Proposition 3 below and prove it
10As well as in the rest of the paper, note that this term shows only the expected net
beneﬁto ft h ec h o i c eo fx b yt h er a n c h e rb e c a u s et h et h ec o s ta n db e n e ﬁts of the choice of
x by the farmer have been normalized to 0.
19in the Appendix. Part (i) has already been shown above.
Proposition 3 Suppose the two parties expect to go to court and their pay-
oﬀ functions are as described in (2) and (3). Then:













(ii) Given a level of ambiguity of property rights of ϕ0 > 1/2,i ti se ﬃcient
to assign these rights to the party that has more at stake (to the rancher if
c<1, and to the farmer if c>1).
The simplicity of the rule of assigning the ambiguous property right in this
case makes the expectation that even a “bumbling bureaucrat” could possi-
bly make in the right direction. 11 Although settlement does not involve the
additional cost of going to court and production induces the maximal social
surplus S∗, going to court could still be better for one or even both parties
if the costs of enforcement were to be low enough compared to those under
settlement. To make welfare comparisons we will calculate enforcement
eﬀorts and equilibrium payoﬀs under f(e)=e and compare them to those
in equations (9)-(11). In particular, under f(e)=e, the following relations






(1 + β)(ϕ +( 1− ϕ)c)2 , ec
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ϕ(1 − ϕ)cCr











ϕ(ϕ +2 ( 1− ϕ)c)Cr
(ϕ +( 1− ϕ)c)2 (22)
In comparing ﬁrst the costs of enforcement under settlement with those
under going-to-court, it should be noted that the ﬁgures in (20) should be
multiplied by (1 + β) since going to court involves the additional cost of
βec
i (i = r,f ). That is, whereas the total costs of enforcement under
settlement are 2eb, those under going-to-court equal (1+β)(ec
r +ec
f). Using
(9) and (20), it is straight forward to show that settlement entails higher
costs if and only if 2
2+β > c
(ϕ+(1−ϕ)c)2. This condition is satisﬁed when the
value of c is suﬃciently small or suﬃciently large.12 That occurs because
when the eﬀects on the two parties are suﬃciently diﬀerent, as they can be
when going to court, both parties exert considerably lower eﬀorts so that the
additional cost of going to court can be overcome. Then, the payoﬀs under
going-to-court in (21) and (22) could well be lower than their respective
payoﬀs under settlement in (10) and (11). This is indeed the case, as shown
by example in the Appendix, and stated in the following result:
Proposition 4 At least one party may ex ante prefer going to court over
bargaining and settlement.








21If one or both parties were to ex ante prefer going to court over settlement,
the game would have to be modiﬁed to allow the outcome of going to court as
a subgame perfect equilibrium, for once at stage 2 both parties would prefer
to settle regardless of the initial choice of enforcement eﬀort. One party
could, for example, commit not to bargain in advance by a burn-the-bridges
act that cuts the lines of communication. We could also think of the same
outcome obtaining when the bargaining costs are suﬃciently high. What
could an administrator or regulator do if the only information he had were
the cost-beneﬁtr a t i oc and had no knowledge of whether the parties would
go to court or not? It would be reasonable to take the weakly preferred
action of assigning the ambiguous right to choose x to the party with the
higher stake.
V. When the Future Casts its Shadow
Thus far we have examined a setting with an one-time interaction between
the two parties or, trivially, as a multi-period repetition of the same exact
conditions and outcomes in every period. However, once the time dimension
is brought in there are non-trivial dynamic considerations that enter the
picture. On the one hand, if one side has the ambiguous property right
and agrees to settle, could the property right become even more atrophied
in the future (see James M. Buchanan, 1989)? On the other hand, when
a court makes a decision it strengthens the property right of the winner
and, presumably,reduces or eliminates the costs of future enforcement. Such
considerations might drive one or both parties to go to court. To examine
such a possibility we consider a non-trivial dynamic extension of the model
22we have analyzed thus far. For simplicity we allow for two periods.13 The
ﬁrst period involves exactly the same characteristics and stages of the static
model. If the parties have not gone to court in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,t h es e c o n d
period also has the same characteristics and stage of the static model. If,
however, the parties have gone to court in the ﬁrst period,the court’s decision
stands in the second period as well and the party that has won has the
complete right to choose x in that period too.14
Both parties discount the second period by the factor δ ∈ (0,1]. We do not
explicitly model the possibility that negotiation and settlement could erode
one’s property right, but it will become clear that our ﬁndings would be,
if anything, strengthened by allowing for such a possibility. Before going
on, we should re-emphasize the basic assumption we have made: the initial
enforcement costs in each period are non-contractible. That is, the two
parties cannot write a binding contract in the ﬁrst period about the level
of enforcement costs they can incur in either period. Thus, enforcement
costs can be eliminated in the second period only if they can be induced by
a subgame perfect equilibrium, and that would be possible typically only
when a court decision has unambiguously assigned property rights in the
ﬁrst period.
13The main ideas are easily generalizable to a ﬁnite horizon of arbitrary length and,
with appropriate modiﬁcations, to an inﬁnite horizon.
14We can allow for the right in the second period not to be perfectly deﬁned, but
strengthened relative to the ﬁrst period, without changing the nature of the results. For
example, after the court’s decision in the ﬁrst period, the winner’s still ambiguous right in
t h es e c o n dp e r i o dc o u l de q u a lϕ
00 > ϕ
0 > 1/2, where ϕ
0 is the favored party’s ﬁrst period
right. That approach could be further generalized by allowing a greater number of periods,
with each court decision reﬁning the property right of the winner. The highest court’s
decision could be thought of as providing the perfectly deﬁned property right. Thus, our
approach here is equivalent to the court’s decision in the ﬁrst period being ﬁnal or not
allowing any appeals.
23V.A. Going to Court with Ex-post Bargaining
We will ﬁrst show that going to court and then bargaining and settling is
a subgame perfect equilibrium under some reasonable set of conditions. In
the one-period model we have seen that whether ex post bargaining can take
place or not does not make a diﬀerence for ex ante bargaining (Proposition
1). In the two-period model, though, that we just outlined,the resolution
of uncertainty following a court decision has implications for the future that
it did not have in the one-period model. Such a decision implies that one
party has gained the unambiguous right to choose x now and in the future
and thus the two parties do not have to incur any enforcement costs in the
second period. By contrast, if a settlement were to be reached ex ante,
enforcement costs will typically have to be incurred in the second period.
Consider any (e1
r,e 1
f) pair of enforcements eﬀorts that have be incurred in
stage 1 of period 1. To derive the threat payoﬀs at stage2, we need to ﬁrst
examine what would occur in stage 4, once a court decision has been made.
At that stage each part has paid e1
i (for i = r,f ) in stage 1 and βe1
i at
the court stage; these costs, because they are sunk, do not play any role in
ex-post bargaining. There are two possible bargaining outcomes, depending
on who has won in court. If the rancher has won, the rancher’s threat
payoﬀ over the two periods would be (1+δ)Br whereas the farmer’s threat
payoﬀ would be −(1+δ)Cr. Given that the surplus over the two periods is
(1 + δ)S∗ and no enforcement costs are incurred in the second period, the
split-the-surplus rule would imply the following payoﬀs if the rancher were
24to win:
Wrr =
(1 + δ)(S∗ + Br + Cr)
2
and Vfr =
(1 + δ)(S∗ − Br − Cr)
2
If the farmer has won in court, then the threat payoﬀs for either party would
be 0 (since the optimal choice of x for the farmer is 0 and B(0) = C(0)).












f)]. Then, expected two-period payoﬀs before going
to court are:
We
r = p1Wrr +( 1− p1)Wfr − βe1
r and We
f = p1Wfr +( 1− p1)Wff − βe1
f

















These are the expected payoﬀs of going to court and, if the parties were
not to go to court, they represent the threat payoﬀs in stage 2. To have
settlement at that stage, it is necessary and suﬃcient that the surplus under
settlement be greater than We
r + We
f =( 1+δ)S∗ − β(e1
r + e1
f), the sum of
the parties’ expected payoﬀs of going to court. The surplus from settlement
equals (1 + δ)S∗ minus any additional enforcement costs. Because no court
costs would be incurred, there would be no additional enforcement costs
in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, however, the parties would face
25exactly the same conditions as those in the one-period model and therefore
they would incur the equilibrium cost of eb each. Thus the net payoﬀ from
settlement would be (1+δ)S∗−2δeb. Comparing this to the surplus of going
to court and then bargaining, we determine that the parties will go to court
if and only if:
(25) 2δeb > β(e1
r + e1
f)
The two parties will thus go to court if the enforcement eﬀorts chosen in
the ﬁrst period are small enough. Low marginal cost of going to court
(i.e., low β ), low discounting of the future (high δ) ,a n dh i g ho n e - p e r i o d
equilibrium eﬀorts eb. To determine whether equilibrium eﬀorts will ever
satisfy (25) ﬁr s tw en e e dt od e ﬁne the appropriate payoﬀ functions. For
(e1
r,e 1
f) combinations that satisfy (25), the parties will go to court and engage
in ex-post bargaining; otherwise, the parties will settle ex-ante and split the
surplus (1+δ)S∗ −2δeb with the payoﬀs in (23) and (24) as threat payoﬀs.
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For f(e)=e, it can be shown that going-to-court occurs if and only if
β
2−β < δ, or when the marginal cost of going to court is not too high and the
26second period is not discounted heavily.15 This result can be shown more
generally. Moreover, regardless of whether the two parties go to court,the
initial assignment of property rights does not aﬀect total enforcement eﬀorts.
Proposition 5 Consider the two-period model, whereby going to court in
the ﬁrst period determines who has the property rights in both periods. Then:
(i) There are combinations of costs of going to court (β) and discount fac-
tors (δ) for which going to court and settling ex post is the subgame perfect
equilibrium; and
(ii) Whether the two parties bargain exp o s to re xa n t ei ne q u i l i b r i u m ,a n d
given a level of ambiguity of property rights of ϕ0 > 1/2,t h ee q u i l i b r i u m
eﬀorts and the net surplus available for division between the two parties are
independent of the initial assignment of rights.
V.B. Going to Court Without Settlement
Even when the parties go to court, part (ii) of Proposition 5 shows that a
version of the Coase theorem holds. The fact that there is settlement after
the parties go to court is critical for this result, for settlement allows the
two parties to split the prize that they are going after which in turn induces
identical enforcement eﬀorts in equilibrium.
There are, however, at least two potential problems with bargaining and
settlement in a dynamic context. First, as mentioned earlier, any kind of
15From (9), we have e
b =
ϕ(1−ϕ)(1+c)Br





f) in (26) and


















1+δ, which in turn is equivalent to
β
2−β < δ.
27bargaining — whether ex ante or ex post — would be diﬃcult to take place
without inducing some erosion of a party’s property right. If for example
the farmer had acquired the right to choose x but acquiesced to choose x∗
in exchange for some transfer from the rancher, the rancher could possibly
use that choice of x as evidence against the rancher’s right at some point in
the future.
Second, evidence suggests that very little bargaining, if at all, takes place
after court decisions are made. For example, Ward Farnsworth (1999, at
page 373)16 “examines twenty nuisance cases and ﬁnds no bargaining after
judgment in any of them; nor did the parties’ lawyers believe that bargaining
would have occurred if judgment had been given to the loser. The lawyers
said that the possibility of such bargaining was foreclosed not by the sorts
of transaction costs that usually are the subject of economic models, but
by animosity between the parties and their distaste for bargaining over the
rights at issue.” Animosity and the use of emotions for strategic purposes
has been noted by some economists (Thomas C. Schelling, 1960; Hirshleifer,
2001, Chapter 10) as a commitment device. Is it possible, then, as it was in
the static model that going to court could yield higher ex ante payoﬀst h a n
those that allow for bargaining? To answer that question, we ﬁrst deﬁne






f)(1 + δ)Br − (1 + β)e1
r







f)(1 + δ)Cr − (1 + β)e1
f
Note that these expected payoﬀ functions diﬀer from those of the one-period
model in (2) and (3) only in that the ﬁrst term of each of them is multiplied
by (1 + δ). A moment’s reﬂection can show why this is a sensible property.
Since the parties will go to court in the ﬁrst period, the court’s decision will
determine who has the property right in both periods, and no bargaining
will ever take place; what matters is the total “prize” over the two periods
which is the sum of the ﬁrst period prize and the discounted sum of the
second period prize. All enforcement eﬀort is undertaken in the ﬁrst period.
Given this similarity of the payoﬀ functions of going to court of the one-
period and two-period models, it is trivial to show the same properties of
equilibrium for the two-period model as those described in Proposition 3.
Furthermore, although the welfare comparisons are not exactly the same in
the two-period model as they were in the one-period model, a two-period
version of Proposition 4 holds here as well: Going to court can be better
for at least one party than allowing any bargaining. We summarize these
ﬁndings in the following:
Proposition 6 Consider the two-period model. Suppose the two parties
expect to go to court and their payoﬀ functions are described in (28) and
(29). Then:











29(ii) Given a level of ambiguity of property rights of ϕ0 > 1/2,i ti se ﬃcient
to assign these rights to the party that has more at stake (to the rancher if
c<1; to the farmer if c>1);a n d
(iii) At least one party may ex ante pref e rg o i n gt oc o u r to v e rb a r g a i n i n g
and settlement.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We have intentionally kept any asymmetries of information or power and
concavities or income eﬀects outside the model so that the conditions con-
form as closely as possible to the basic formulation of the Coase theorem
with zero transaction costs. This way we have been able to focus on the
eﬀect of enforcement costs. What is somewhat surprising is the possibility
that going court can be an equilibrium or ex ante Pareto superior when the
costs of enforcement are taken into account. That is when not only the
Coase theorem does not hold, but also a very simple rule — based on the
cost and beneﬁts of the activity that produces the externality — can be used
to assign the more eﬃcient property rights structure. This optimality of a
targeted assignment of property rights comes about because the absence of
a negotiated settlement introduces an asymmetry in the payoﬀso ft h et w o
parties, which translates in diﬀerent enforcement eﬀorts. The introduction
of other asymmetries in the model would similarly induce diﬀerent enforce-
ment eﬀorts. Two types of asymmetries that could be readily introduced
are diﬀerential bargaining power or a liquidity constraint for one party that
limits its ability to incur enforcement costs. Despite the diﬀerent enforce-
30ment eﬀorts that would be induced, it is unclear whether simple rules for
the initial assignment of property rights can be found as we found for the
case of going to court subsequent without negotiation.
31Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1, Part (i): Consider any given (er,e f)a n dt h e
associated win probability of the rancher p ≡
ϕf(er)
[ϕf(er)+(1−ϕ)f(ef)].O u r o b -
jective is to ﬁnd the appropriate payoﬀ functions taking into account that
bargaining and settlement will take place. The disagreement or threat pay-
oﬀs at the ex post bargaining stage (stage 2) are those that would be induced
from going to court. In turn, these payoﬀ w o u l dd e p e n do nw h a tc a nb e
expected to occur at the stage of ex post bargaining. We therefore proceed
by backward induction, beginning with the last stage of the game of ex post
bargaining. Because the court has decided at this stage, there are two pos-
sible bargaining outcomes depending on whether the rancher or the farmer
has won the right to choose x. If the rancher has won the threat payoﬀs
would be Br for the rancher and −Cr for the farmer. Given that the surplus
is S∗, the split-the-surplus rule would then imply the following payoﬀsf o r
the two parties:
Vrr =
S∗ + Br + Cr
2
and Vfr =
S∗ − Br − Cr
2
Note that no er or ef appear in these expressions because enforcement ex-
penditures have already been incurred at the initial and court stages of the
game and thus represent sunk costs at the ex post bargaining stage. If
the rancher were to win the right to choose x, the disagreement payoﬀsf o r








32The expected payoﬀs of the two parties just before going to court would be:
Vr = pVrr +( 1− p)Vfr − βer and Vf = pVfr +( 1− p)Vff − βef















Note that the costs of going to court for each party, βer for the rancher and
βef for the farmer, are included here since the have yet to be incurred at
the ex ante bargaining stage (stage 2). At that stage, the split-the-surplus
rule then implies, the following payoﬀs:
V ab
r =






























The payoﬀ functions in Proposition 1 are obtained by subtracting the ex-
penditures of each party at the ﬁrst stage of the game (er for the rancher
and ef for the farmer).
Part (ii): To prove the second part of the Proposition, suppose the game
would end without any negotiations once a court decision were to be made.
Then, with the initial choices (er,e f) given, the expected payoﬀsb e f o r e
going to court are:
V 0
r = pBr − βer and V 0
f = −pCr − βef










2 . It is a matter or simple algebra to show
that these payoﬀ are identical to those in V ab
r and V ab
f above. Hence, the
payoﬀ functions would be the same as those in the statement of Proposition
1.
Proof of Proposition 3, Part (ii): Suppose, at the rancher’s optimum
xr, the cost to the farmer is higher than the beneﬁt to the rancher, so that
B(xr) <C (xr). We need to compare the sum of the equilibrium eﬀorts
ec
f + ec






ϕ=1−ϕ0 , er ≡ ec




ϕ=ϕ0 and er ≡ ec
r|ϕ=ϕ0
Recall from the ﬁrst order conditions that, in any Nash equilibrium, we must
have:
g(er)=cg(ef)





These conditions also means that ef, ef and er, ,er must “move” in the




and therefore ef < ef.C o n v e r s e l y , i f er > er, then we must also have
ef > ef by the same reasoning. Thus, to prove the result, it suﬃces to
show that c>1i m p l i e st h a ter < er. Suppose, to the contrary that c>1
and er ≥ er. Then, we also have ef ≥ ef.T h e ﬁrst order conditions for








These two conditions imply that:
f0(er)f(ef)
[(1 − ϕ0)f(er)+ϕ0f(ef)]2 =
f0(er)f(ef)
[ϕ0f(er)+( 1− ϕ0)f(ef)]2




It is straightforward to show that this function is decreasing in each of its











where the inequality follows from the assumption that f00 < 0. A l s o ,w h e n




=s g n{[ϕf(er)+( 1− ϕ)f(ef)] − 2(1− ϕ)f(ef)}
=s g n [ ϕf(er) − (1 − ϕ)f(ef)]
< sgn[ϕf(ef) − (1 − ϕ)f(ef)]
=s g n[ f(ef)(2ϕ − 1)] < 0
where the second last inequality follows from the fact that er <e f when
c>1a n dt h eﬁnal inequality follows from the fact that 2ϕ − 1 < 0w h e n
ϕ < 1/2. Therefore, assuming that c>1a n der ≤ er we have:
f0(er)f(ef)








[ϕ0f(er)+( 1− ϕ0)f(ef)]2 =
f0(er)f(ef)
[(1 − ϕ0)f(er)+ϕ0f(ef)]2
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that pr(er,.) is a decreasing function
of er and the assumption that er ≤ er. The second inequality follows from
the fact that pr(.,ef) is a decreasing function of ef when ϕ =1− ϕ0 < 1/2
and the fact that er ≤ er also implies that ef ≤ ef. The last inequality
follows from the fact that, since c>1i m p l i e st h a ter < ef,w em u s ta l s o
have (1 − ϕ0)f(er)+ϕ0f(ef) > ϕ0f(er)+( 1− ϕ0)f(ef). The last equality,
which follows from the equality of the ﬁrst order conditions when ϕ =1−ϕ0
and ϕ = ϕ0, gives a contradiction. Thus, it must be the case that er < er,
from which it also follows that ef < ef,a n ds oef +er < ef +er, as required.
The second part of the result, that c<1 implies that ef +er <e f +er,c a n
36be proved in a similar fashion.




f) in (21) attains a higher value than V b




f) in(22) has a lower value than V b
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Note that the left-hand-side of this inequality is continuous in c and its limit
as c → 0 exists and equals the value of the left-hand-side at c =0 . That limit
can be shown to equal Br(2−ϕ)/2 >B r/2. Note that Br = B(xr) ≥ B(x∗)
since xr maximizes B(x). Therefore, Br(2 − ϕ)/2 >B (x∗)/2 > (B(x∗) −
C(x∗))/2=S∗/2 and the limit of the left—hand-side of the equation above
as c → 0 is strictly greater than its right-hand-side. Hence,for c suﬃciently




r (eb,e b). Next, to the farmer’s








(4 + β − 2ϕ)(1 + c)
2(2 + β)
−
(ϕ +2 ( 1− ϕ)c)c





Again, we will follow the same method as in the case of the rancher above
and consider the limit of the left-hand-side as c → 0 of the inequality above
which equals ϕBr
4+β−2ϕ
2(2+b) .F o r ϕ suﬃciently large, this limit can be shown to





f (eb,e b). [Note that the conditions for the farmer’s payoﬀ
being higher under going-to-court are more stringent than the equivalent
conditions for the rancher. However, the opposite can be shown to hold
when c is suﬃciently small. In that case the conditions for the farmer are
37much less stringent, whereas for large c it is impossible for the rancher’s
payoﬀ under going-to-court to be higher than that under bargaining.]
Proof of Proposition 5, Part (i): Suppose initially that (25) is satisﬁed
(2δeb > β(e1
r,e 1
f)) and derive the implied Nash equilibrium using the payoﬀ
functions in (26). Such an equilibrium is symmetric with e1
r = e1
f = ep,
which is implicitly deﬁned by:
ϕ(1 − ϕ)f0(ep)
f(ep)
(1 + δ)(1 + c)Br
2
− (1 + β)=0
Condition (25) then reduces to δeb > βep, where eb is implicitly deﬁned
in (8) (note that (1 + c)Br = Br + Cr). (25) is automatically satisﬁed for
combinations of β =0a n da n yδ > 0. Both eb and ep are diﬀerentiable, and
therefore continuous,functions of β. Thus, (25) must be satisﬁed for other
combinations of β and δ, with β close enough to zero.
Part (ii): From the implicit deﬁnition of ep above, it is clear that ep does
not depend on whether ϕ = ϕ0 or ϕ =1− ϕ0. Therefore, when the two
parties bargain ex ante, equilibrium eﬀorts and net surplus are independent
of the initial assignment of rights. When the two parties bargain ex ante, it
is straightforward to show the same result.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : The proofs of parts (i)a n d( ii)o ft h eP r o p o s i -
tion are virtually identical to the proofs of parts (i)a n d( ii)of Proposition
3. (The only diﬀerence is that the payoﬀ functions in the two period model
are (1+δ) multiples of the one period payoﬀ functions, but the comparative
statics can easily be shown to be identical.) We therefore concentrate on
proving part (iii), a major part of which is identical to the proof of Propo-
38sition 4. As in that proof, we consider the case of f(e)=e. Then, the




(ϕ +( 1− ϕ)c)2
Wc
f = −
ϕ(ϕ +2 ( 1− ϕ)c)(1 + δ)cBr
(ϕ +( 1− ϕ)c)2
Note that these payoﬀsa r ej u s tV c
i (ec
i,e c
i) multiplied by (1 + δ). We need
to compare these payoﬀs to those that correspond to the equilibrium under
(either ex ante or ex post) settlement with the payoﬀ functions in (26) and
(27). When the two sides settle ex ante, the comparison is identical to that
in the proof of Proposition 4, except that all payoﬀs are to be multiplied by
(1+δ) without aﬀecting the comparisons. When the two sides settle ex post
under (26) and (27), with 2δeb > β(e1
r + e1















ϕ(2 − ϕ)(1 + δ)(1 + c)Br
2
Note ﬁrst that Wc
r >W
ep











The left-hand-side of this inequality is continuous in c and its limit as c → 0
exists and equals the value of the left-hand-side at c =0 . That limit can be
shown to equal Br(2−ϕ2)/2 >B r/2. Note that Br = B(xr) ≥ B(x∗)s i n c exr
maximizes B(x). Therefore, Br(2−ϕ)/2 >B (x∗)/2 > (B(x∗)−C(x∗))/2=
S∗/2 and the limit of the left—hand-side of the equation above as c → 0i s
39strictly greater than its right-hand-side. Hence, for c suﬃciently close to 0,
we must have Wc
r >W
ep
r . Next, we have Wc
f >W
ep
f if and only if:
ϕBr
µ
(2 − ϕ)(1 + c)
2
−
(ϕ +2 ( 1− ϕ)c)c





Again, as above, the left-hand-side of this inequality is continuous in c and
its limit as c → 0 exists and equals the value of the left-hand-side at c =0 .
The limit at c =0e q u a l sϕ(2 − ϕ)Br/2, which for suﬃciently large ϕ is




f for c small enough and large enough ϕ.T h u s , a s r e q u i r e d i n
part (iii) of the Proposition, we have found conditions under which going
to court and never negotiating is preferable by at least one party.
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